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ABSTRACT
Gang violence is a major problem in the United States ac-
counting for a large fraction of homicides and other vio-
lent crime. In this paper, we study the problem of early
identification of violent gang members. Our approach re-
lies on modified centrality measures that take into account
additional data of the individuals in the social network of
co-arrestees which together with other arrest metadata pro-
vide a rich set of features for a classification algorithm. We
show our approach obtains high precision and recall (0.89
and 0.78 respectively) in the case where the entire network
is known and out-performs current approaches used by law-
enforcement to the problem in the case where the network
is discovered overtime by virtue of new arrests - mimick-
ing real-world law-enforcement operations. Operational is-
sues are also discussed as we are preparing to leverage this
method in an operational environment.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer
Applications]: Sociology
General Terms: Security; Experimentation
Keywords: Social Network Analysis; Criminology
1. INTRODUCTION
Gang violence is a major problem in the United States [1,
2] - accounting for 20 to 50 percent of homicides in many
major cities [10]. Yet, law enforcement actually has exist-
ing data on many of these groups. For example the un-
derlying social network structure is often recorded by law-
enforcement and has previously been shown useful in en-
abling “smart policing” tactics [17] and improving law
-enforcement’s understanding of a gang’s organizational struc-
ture [19]. In this paper we look to leverage this gang social
network information to create features that allows us to clas-
sify individuals as potentially violent. While the results of
such a classifier are insufficient to lead to arrests, it is able
to provide the police leads to individuals who are likely to
be involved in violence, allowing for a more focused policing
with respect to patrols and intelligence gathering. Our key
aim is to significantly reduce the population of potential vio-
lent gang members which will lead to more efficient policing.
In this paper, we introduce our method for identifying
potentially violent gang members that leverages features de-
rived from the co-arestee social network of criminal gangs in
∗These authors contributed equally to this work.
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a classifier to identify potentially violent individuals. We
note that this classification problem is particularly difficult
due to not only data imbalances, but also due to the fact that
many violent crimes are conducted due to heightened emo-
tions - and hence difficult to identify. Though we augment
our network-based features with some additional meta-data
from the arrest records, our approach does not leverage fea-
tures concerning the race, ethnicity, or gender of individuals
in the social network. We evaluate our method using real-
world offender data from the Chicago Police Department.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We discuss how centrality measurements such as de-
gree, closeness, and betweenness when modified to ac-
count for metadata about past offenses such as the
type of offense and whether the offense was classified
as “violent” can serve as robust features for identifying
violent offenders.
• We show how the network features, combined with
other feature categories provide surprisingly robust per-
formance when the entire offender is known in terms of
both precision (0.89) and recall (0.78) using cross-fold
validation.
• We then test our methods in the case where the net-
work is exposed over time (by virtue of new arrests)
which mimics an operational situation. Though preci-
sion and recall are reduced in this case, we show that
our method significantly outperforms the baseline ap-
proach currently in use by law-enforcement - on aver-
age increasing precision and recall by more than two
and three times respectively.
In addition to these main results, we also present some side
results on the structure and nature of the police dataset we
examine. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
motivate this difficult problem within the law-enforcement
community. This is followed by a description of our dataset
along with technical notation in Section 3. There, we also
describe some interesting aspects of the gang arrest dataset
and our co-arrestee network. In Section 4 we formally de-
fine our problem, describe existing approaches, and then de-
scribe the features we use in our approach. Then we present
our results in Section 5 for both cases where we assume the
underlying network is known and when we discover the net-
work over time (mimicking an operational scenario). Finally,
related work is discussed in Section 6.
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2. BACKGROUND
A recent study shows that the network for gunshot vic-
timization is denser than previously believed [16]. According
to the authors, within the city of Chicago over 70% of all
gunshot victims are contained within only 6% of the total
population These findings validate what has been consid-
ered common knowledge among police for decades: who you
hang out with matters, and if you hang out with those who
engage in or are victims of violence you are more likely to
become an offender or victim yourself.
Identifying potential offenders of gun violence has also
been a staple practice for most law enforcement agencies
as an attempt to curtail future victimization. When gang
conflicts get “hot,” it’s common for law enforcement agents
to put together a list of known “shooters”: those known
gang members with an existing criminal history for gun vi-
olence and a predilection for engaging in such illegal activ-
ity. Law enforcement agents then attempt to make contact
with these individuals with the expectation that such direct
contact might prevent violence. For most law enforcement
agencies, however, this practice is performed in a very ad-
hoc manner. Identifying these individuals for intervention
has relied primarily on the ability of law enforcement agents
to remember and identify at-risk individuals. While feasible
for small or discreet networks, the ability to recall multiple
individuals in large networks that cross large geographic re-
gions and interact with multiple networks becomes increas-
ing difficult. This difficulty increases significantly as rela-
tionships between networks change, known individuals leave
the network, and new individuals enter it. In particular,
the practice is less than idea because it requires officers to
attempt to recall criminal history and network association
data that varies between network members. For example,
a subject who has been arrested on multiple occasions for
carrying a gun or has been arrested for shooting another in-
dividual is easy to recall, but recalling and quantifying the
risk for a subject with multiple arrests for non-gun violence
and a direct association with several offenders and victims
of gun violence can be much more difficult. In short, iden-
tifying a known “shooter” is relatively straightforward: they
are known. The approach in this paper synthesizes network
connectivity other attributes of the subject to identify those
individuals at risk that law enforcement might not yet know.
Using this information, law enforcement agents may not
only more reliably and consistently identify those individuals
most likely to engage in acts of violence or become victims
of violence due to their personal associations with it, but
also to more effectively manage agency resources. Interven-
tion strategies may include service providers outside law en-
forcement, such as family members, social service providers,
current or former educators, and clergy. This diversity in
approach not only delivers a more powerful “stop the vio-
lence” message but provides a kind of force multiplier for
law enforcement, increasing the number of persons involved
in the effort to prevent violence. Identifying specific individ-
uals for intervention also allows for a more targeted effort by
law enforcement in terms of personnel and geographic areas
needing coverage. Blanketing violence reduction strategies
that saturate geographic areas with law enforcement agents
and rely on direct contact with large numbers of criminal
network members are inefficient and resource consuming.
Focusing efforts on those individuals most likely to engage in
violence allows law enforcement to focus on smaller groups
of people and smaller geographic areas (those areas within
which those individuals identified are known to frequent).
Therefore, our approach can significantly improve such ef-
forts to identify violent individuals. In this paper, we see
how our method not only out-performs the current social
network heuristic used by police, but also that it provides
a much smaller and more precise list of potentially violent
offenders than simply listing those with a violent criminal
record.
3. GANG CO-OFFENDER NETWORK
In this section, we introduce the necessary basic notation
to describe our co-offender network and then provide de-
tails of our real-world criminal dataset and study some of
its properties.
3.1 Technical Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we shall represent an offender net-
work as an undirected graph G = (V,E) where the nodes
correspond with previous offenders and an undirected edge
exists between offenders if they were arrested together. We
will use τ to denote the set of timepoints (dates). We also
have three sets of labels for the nodes: V, S, gang which
are the sets of violent crimes, non violent crimes, and gangs.
For each time point t and each node v, the binary variable
arrtv ∈ {true, false} denotes if v was arrested at time t and
distrtv, beat
t
v, gang
t
v to denote the district, beat, and gang af-
filiation of v at time t (we will assume that time is fine-grain
enough to ensure that at each time unit an individual is ar-
rested no more than once). If we drop the t superscript for
these three symbols, it will denote the most recent district,
beat, and gang associated with v in the knowledgebase. We
shall use the sets Vtv and Stv to denote the set of violent and
non violent offenses committed by v at time t respectively.
Note if arrtv = false then Vtv = ∅. We will drop the super-
script t for this symbol to denote the union of labels at any
time t in the historical knowledgebase. We also note that
the edges in the graph also depend on time, but for sake of
readability, we shall state with words the duration of time
considered for the edges.
For a given violent crime c ∈ V∪S, we will use the notation
V tc = {v ∈ V s.t. c ∈ Vtv} (intuitively, the subset of the
population who have committed crime c at time t). Again,
we will drop the superscript t if v could have committed
crime c at any time in the historical knowledgebase. For
a set of labels C ⊆ V ∪ S, we will extend this notation:
V tC = {v ∈ V s.t. C ∩ Vtv 6= ∅}. We will slightly abuse
notation here: V t∅ = V . We will use similar notation for
denoting a subset of the population that are members of a
certain gang. For instance, Vgangv refers to the set of nodes
who are in the same gang as node v. Likewise, we shall use
the same notation for subgraphs: GtC is the subgraph of G
containing only nodes in V tC and their adjacent edges. We
will use the function d : V × V → N to denote the distance
between two nodes - which for this paper will be the number
of links in the shortest path. For a given node v, the set
N iv = {v′ ∈ V s.t. d(v, v′) = i} – the set of nodes that are
whose shortest path is exactly i hops from v. For two nodes
v, v′, we will use the notation σ(v, v′) to be the number of
shortest paths between v and v′. For nodes u, v, v′, σu(v, v′)
will be the number of shortest paths between v and v′ that
pass through u.
Table 1: Summary of arrest data.
Name Value
Number of records 64466
Violent offense 4450
Homicide 312
Criminal sexual assault 153
Robbery 1959
Aggravated assault 1441
Aggravated battery 896
Non violent offense 60016
Table 2: Network properties.
Name Values
Vertices 9373
Edges 17197
Average degree 3.66
Average clustering 0.5
Transitivity 0.62
Connected components 1843
Largest connected component di-
ameter
36
Largest connected component aver-
age path length
12.22
Largest connected component aver-
age clustering
0.63
For a given subgraph G′ of G, we shall use C(G′) to de-
note the largest connected component of G′ and for node
v ∈ G′, we will use the notation Cv(G′) to denote the con-
nected component of G′ to which v belongs. If we apply a
community finding algorithm to subgraph G′, we will use
the notation Pv(G
′) to denote the partition of G′ to which
v belongs. We will use the notation |·| to denote the size of
a set or the number of nodes in a subgraph.
3.2 Overview of Network Data
In this section we describe our police dataset and the asso-
ciated co-offender network as well as some interesting char-
acteristics that we have noticed.
Police Dataset. Our dataset consists of gang-related ar-
rest incidents gathered from August 2011 - August 2014 in
Chicago as well as their immediate associates. This data set
includes locations, dates, the links between the joint arrests,
and the gang affiliation of the offenders. In Table 1, we sum-
marize some of the important characteristics of the dataset.
Violent Crimes. In our dataset, the set V consists of the
following crimes have been identified by the Chicago Police
as violent crimes: homicide (first or second degree murder),
criminal sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and ag-
gravated battery. All aforementioned offenses are also FBI
“index”crimes as well. A key aspect about the violent crimes
is that the dataset is highly imbalanced with much more ar-
rests for non violent crimes vs. arrests for violent crimes
(60016 vs. 4450).
Network Properties. From the arrest data, we were able
to construct the co-offender network. In this network, the
Figure 1: The gang co-offender network. Each color corre-
sponds with a different gang.
isolated vertices are eliminated due to the lack of structural
information. A visualization of the network is depicted in
Figure 1 and we have included summary statistics in Table 2.
In studying this network, we studied its degree distribution
(Figure 2). Unlike the degree distribution for other scale free
social networks, the degree distribution for the offender net-
work is exponential rather than power law. However, despite
the degree distribution being similar to that of a random (E-
R) or small world network topology [27], we noticed other
characteristics that indicate differently. The co-offender net-
work has a much higher average clustering coefficient than in
a random network and does not follow the properties of the
small world topology due to the relative high diameter and
average shortest path (computed for the largest connected
component.)
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Figure 2: Network degree distribution. The exponential
function fits to the distribution (R2 = 0.77).
Repeat Offenders. There are many instances of repeated
offenses from the same offender. Figure 3 shows the dis-
tribution of the repeated arrests for each individual in the
dataset. This indicates that arrest records have utility in
identifying future offenders.
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Figure 3: Repeated arrests. 12866 instances of one-time
arrests have been removed.
Seasonality of Crime. There is also a higher chance of
criminal activities in different months of the year. Figure 4
demonstrates some of these variations. As per police ob-
servations, both violent and non-violent crime incidents are
lower in the winter months (Dec.-Feb.).
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Figure 4: Seasonality of crime.
4. IDENTIFYING VIOLENT OFFENDERS
In this section, we describe our problem, some of the exist-
ing practical approaches used by law-enforcement, and our
approach based on supervised learning with features primar-
ily generated by the network topology.
4.1 Problem Statement
Given a co-offender network, G = (V,E) and for each
historical timepoint t ∈ τ = {1, . . . , tmax} and v ∈ V , we
have the values of arrtv, distr
t
v, beat
t
v and elements of the
sets Vtv, gangtv, we wish to identify set {v ∈ V s.t. ∃t >
tmax where |Vtv|> 0}. In other words, we wish to find a set
of offenders in our current co-offender network that commit
a violent crime in the future.
4.2 Existing Methods
Here we describe two common techniques often used by
law-enforcement to predict violent offenders. The first is
a simple heuristic based on violent activities in the past.
The second is a heuristic that was based on the findings of
[17] which was designed to locate future victims of violent
crime. Both of these approaches are ad-hoc practical ap-
proaches that have become “best practices” for predicting
violent offenders. However, we are not aware of any data-
driven, formal evaluation of these methods in the literature.
Past Violent Activities (PVA). The first ad-hoc ap-
proach is quite simple: if an offender has committed a vi-
olent crime in the past, we claim that he will commit a
violent crime in the future. An obvious variant of this ap-
proach is to return the set of violent offenders from the last
∆t days. We note in practice, if police also have records of
those who are incarcerated, and such individuals would be
removed from the list (due to the different jurisdictions of
police and corrections in the Chicago area, we did not have
access to incarceration data - however discussed re-arrests
observed in the data in the previous section).
Two-Hop Heuristic (THH). The two-hop heuristic is
based on the result of [17] which investigated a social net-
work of gunshot victims in Boston and found an inverse re-
lationship between the probability of being a gunshot victim
and the shortest path distance on the network to the nearest
previous gunshot victim. Hence, THH returns all neighbors
one and two hops away from previous violent criminals (see
Algorithm 1 for details on the version we used in our ex-
periments - which was the best-performing variant for our
data). The Chicago Police have adopted a variant of this
method to identify potential gang victims using a combina-
tion of arrest and victim data - the co-arrestee network of
criminal gang members includes many individuals who are
also victims of violent crime (this is a direct result of gang
conflict). We note that victim information did not offer a
significant improvement to our approach, except the trivial
case that a homicide victim cannot commit any crime in the
future.
4.3 Supervised Learning Approach
We evaluated many different supervised learning approaches
including Naive Bayes (NB), Linear Regression (LR), Deci-
sion Tree (DT), Random Forest (RF), Neural Network (NN),
and support vector machines (SVM) on the same set of fea-
tures for the nodes in the network that we shall describe in
this section. We also explored combining these approaches
Algorithm 1 Two-Hop Heuristic
1: procedure TwoHop(G) . Offender network G.
2: R← {} . Identified violent offenders.
3: V ICTIMS ← {u ∈ G|is homicide victim(u)}
4: for v ∈ V ICTIMS do
5: N ← N1v ∪N2v . Immediate neighbors
6: R← R ∪ {u ∈ N s.t. Vu = ∅}
7: return R
with techniques for imbalanced data such as SMOTE [4] and
Borderline SMOTE [9], however we do not report the results
of Borderline SMOTE as it provided no significant difference
from SMOTE. We group our features into four categories:
(1.) neighborhood-based (having to do with the immedi-
ate neighbors of a given node), (2.) network-based (features
that require the consideration of more than a nodes imme-
diate and nearby neighbors), (3.) temporal characteristics,
and (4.) geographic characteristics.
4.3.1 Neighborhood-Based Features
Neighborhood-based features are the features computed
using each node and its first and/or second level neighbors
in G – often with respect to some C ⊆ V. The simplest such
measure is the degree of vertex v – corresponding to the
number of offenders arrested with v. We can easily extend
this for some set of crimes of interest (C) where we look at
all the neighbors of v who have committed a crime in C.
This generalizes degree (as that is the case where C = ∅).
In our experiments, we found the most useful neighborhood
features to be in the case where C = V though standard
degree (C = ∅) was also used. We also found that using
combinations of the following booleans based on the below
definition also proved to be useful:
majv(C, i) = |{u|u ∈ (∪iN iv) ∩ VC}|≥ 0.5× |(∪iN iv)|
Intuitively, majv(C, i) is true if at least half of the nodes
within a network distance of i from node v have committed
a crime in C and false otherwise. Using these intuitions, we
explored the space of variants of these neighborhood-based
features and list those we found to be best-performing in
Table 3.
4.3.2 Network-Based Features
Network-based features fall into two sub-categories that
we shall describe in this section: community-based and path-
based.
Network-based community features. We use several
notions of a node’s community when engineering features:
the connected component to which a node belongs, the gang
to which a node belongs, and what we will refer to as an in-
dividual’s group. The connected component is simply based
on the overall network structure, while the gang is sim-
ply the subgraph induced by the individuals in the net-
work who belong to the same gang (the social network of
node v’s gang is denoted Ggangv . A nodes group is defined
as the partition he/she belongs to based on a partition of
Ggangv found using the Louvain algorithm [5]. We found
in our previous work [19] and ensuing experience with the
Chicago Police that the groups produced in this method
Table 3: Neighborhood-Based Features
Description Definition
Degree (w.r.t. C) |{u|u ∈ N1v ∩ VC}|
Fraction of 1-hop
neighbors com-
mitting a crime
in C
|{u|u ∈ N1v ∩ VC}|/|N1v |
Fraction of 2-hop
neighbors com-
mitting a crime
in C
|{u|u ∈ N2v ∩ VC}|/|N2v |
Majority of 1-hop
and 2-hop neigh-
bors committing
a crime in C
majv(C, 1) ∧majv(C, 2)
Minority of 1-hop
and majority of
2-hop neighbors
comitting a crime
in C
¬majv(C, 1) ∧majv(C, 2)
Table 4: Network-Based Features (Community)
Description Definition
Component
size when v is
removed
|C(Cv(G) \ {v})|
Largest compo-
nent size with a
violent node after
v is removed
maxv′∈C(Cv(G){v}∩VV |Xv′ |
where Xv′ = Cv′(Cv(G){v})
Group size |Pv(Ggangv )|
Relationships
within the group
|{(u, v) ∈ E s.t. u, v ∈
Pv(Ggangv )}|
Number of vio-
lent members in
the group
|{v′ ∈ Pv(Ggangv ) s.t. Vv 6= ∅}|
Triangles in
group
No. of triangles within sub-
graph Pv(Ggangv )
Transitivity of
group
No. of triangles in Pv(Ggangv )
No. of “∨”’s in Pv(Ggangv )
Group-to-group
connections
|{u ∈ Pv(Ggangv ) s.t. ∃(u,w) ∈
E where w /∈ Pv(Ggangv )}|
Gang-to-gang
connections
|{u ∈ Ggangv s.t. ∃(u,w) ∈ E
where w /∈ Ggangv}|
were highly relevant operationally. In this work, we also
examined other community finding methods (i.e. Infomap,
and Spectral Clustering) and found we obtained the best re-
sults by using the Louvain algorithm. We provide our best
performing network-based community features that we used
in Table 4. Of particular interest, we found for individual
Table 5: Network-Based Features (Path)
Description Definition
Betweenness
(w.r.t. C)
∑
u,w∈VC
σv(u,w)
σ(u,w)
Closeness (w.r.t.
C)
(|VC |−1)/∑u∈VC d(u, v)
Shell Number
(w.r.t. C)
shellC(v) (see appendix for fur-
ther details)
Propagation
(w.r.t. C)
1 if v ∈ Γκ(VV), 0 otherwise.
(see appendix for further de-
tails)
v that features relating to the size of the largest connected
component resulting v′ removal of his/her connected com-
ponent was useful. Another interesting pair of features we
noted for both group and gang were the number of edges
from members of that group/gang to a different group or
gang. We hypothesize that the utility of these features is a
result of conflicts between groups/gangs they are connected
to as well as the spread of violence amongst different groups
(i.e. if two groups are closely connected, one may conduct
violent activities on behalf of the other).
Network-based path features. We looked at several fea-
tures that leveraged the paths in the network by adopting
three common node metrics from the literature: between-
ness, closeness [6], and shell-number [23] as well as a prop-
agation process based on a deterministic tipping model [8].
The features are listed in Table 5. We examined our modi-
fied definitions of closeness, betweenness, and shell number
where C was a single element of V, where C = V and where
C = ∅ (which provides the standard definitions of these
measures). Our intuition was that individuals nearer in the
network to other violent individuals would also tend to be
more violent - and we found several interesting relationships
such as that for closeness (where C = VV) discussed in sec-
tion 5.1 when we run the classifier on each feature group.
Shell number and the propagation process were used to cap-
ture the idea of the spread of violence (as shell number was
previously shown to correspond with “spreaders” in various
network epidemic models [11]). For the propagation process,
we set the threshold (κ) equal to two, three, four, five, and
six. Further details on shell number and the propogation
process can be found in the appendix.
4.3.3 Geographic Features
Geographic features capture the information related to
the location of a crime incident. The intuition is that the
individuals who commit crimes in violent districts are more
likely to become violent than the others. We found that the
beat the individual has committed a crime in is an impor-
tant feature for our problem. This is in accordance with
previous well known literature in criminology [3, 21] which
studies spatio-temporal modeling of criminal behavior. The
complete list is shown in Table 6.
4.3.4 Temporal Features
We considered couple of temporal features: average inter-
Table 6: Geographic Features
Name Definition
District Fre-
quency
|{(t, v′) s.t. arrtv′ = true ∧
∃t′ s.t. distrtv′ = distrt
′
v }|
Beat Frequency |{(t, v′) s.t. arrtv′ = true ∧
∃t′ s.t. beattv′ = beatt
′
v }|
Beat Violence |{(t, v′) s.t. arrtv′ = true∧Vtv′ 6=
∅ ∧ ∃t′ s.t. beattv′ = beatt
′
v }|
District Violence |{(t, v′) s.t. arrtv′ = true∧Vtv′ 6=
∅ ∧ ∃t′ s.t. distrtv′ = distrt
′
v }|
val month and number of violent groups. Average interval
time considers the average time duration of consecutive ar-
rests of the offender. The other feature, which we examine,
is number of violent groups appeared over time in the envi-
ronment. We examined that the number of violent groups
has been an important temporal aspect for identifying the
violent criminals. The key intuition here is, if at least one
member of the offender’s groups (formed over time) is vio-
lent then we consider the offender as a part of that violent
group. For an individual v, we define the partially ordered
set tvC = {t s.t. arrtv = true ∧ V tC 6= ∅} (intuitively the set
of the time points where v has committed at least on of the
crimes in C.) We also define ∆vi (C) = t
v
i − tvi−1 for each
tvi ∈ tvC . Considering these definitions, we formally define
the temporal features in Table 7.
Table 7: Temporal Features
Name Definition
Average interval
time (w.r.t. C)
∑
i ∆
v
i (C)/|tvC |
Number of vio-
lent groups
|{t s.t. arrtv = true ∧
∃v′ s.t. arrtv′ = true ∧
Vtv 6= ∅ ∧
v′ ∈ N tv}|
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we review the results of our experiments.
We looked at two types: experiments where the entire co-
offender network is known before-hand (Section 5.1) and ex-
periments where the network is discovered over time (Sec-
tion 5.2). The intuition behind the experiments where the
co-offender network is known is that the police often have
additional information to augment co-arrestee data. This
information can include informant reporting, observed indi-
viduals interacting by patrolmen, intelligence reporting, and
information discovered on social media and the Internet. In
our second type of experiment we discover the network over
time in an effort to mimic real-world operations - however,
we also show that this makes the problem more difficult as
it reduces the power of neighborhood-based and network-
based features. Based on our discussions with the Chicago
Police, we believe that real-world results will most likely fall
somewhere between these two experiments. Operationally,
we will not have full arrest data, but the aforementioned
augmenting data sources are available (even though we did
not have access to them for our experiments).
5.1 Known Co-Offender Network
In this experiment we assume that the entire offender net-
work is known. In other words, to compute the features for
each vertex v, we assume that the set Vv is unknown while
the rest of the network is observable. In here we compared
our approach with THH but not with the PVA as we do not
utilize time. In each of the experiments described in this sec-
tion, we conduct 10-fold cross validation. We consider the
result of each approach as a set of nodes that the approach
considers to be a set of potentially violent individuals. Our
primary metrics are precision (fraction of reported violent
individual who were actually violent in the dataset), recall
(fraction of violent individuals in the dataset reported by the
approach), F1 (the harmonic mean of precision and recall)
and area under the curve. We conduct two types of experi-
ments: first, we study classification performance using only
features within a given category (neighborhood, network,
temporal, and geographic), then we study the classification
performance when the entire feature set is used but with
various different classification algorithms and compare the
result to THH.
Classification using single feature categories. Here
we describe classification results using single feature cate-
gories. In this set of experiments, we use a random forest
classifier (which we will later show provides the best perfor-
mance of the classifiers that we examined). Figure 5 shows
the performance of RF for the described categories. The
network-based features are highly-correlated to violent be-
havior with average F1 value of 0.72 compared to 0.63 for
neighborhood, 0.21 for geographic, and 0.03 for temporal
features. In Figure 6, we show the performance of a feature
from each category to classify violent vs. non violent crimes;
the performance of each example is a good indicator of the
performance of its category.
0	  
0.1	  
0.2	  
0.3	  
0.4	  
0.5	  
0.6	  
0.7	  
0.8	  
0.9	  
1	  
Neighborhood-­‐
Based	  
Network-­‐Based	   Geographic	   Temporal	  
Features	  	  
Precision	   Recall	   F1	  
Figure 5: Precision, recall, and F1 comparison between
each group of features.
Classification comparison. Table 8 shows the perfor-
mance of different classification algorithms. According to
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Figure 6: Example features from each category. (a)
Neighborhood-based: Minority of 1-hop and major-
ity of 2-hop neighbors committing a crime in C.
(b) Network-based: Closeness (w.r.t. V). (c) Ge-
ographic: Beat violence. (d) Temporal: Average
interval months.
0	  
0.1	  
0.2	  
0.3	  
0.4	  
0.5	  
0.6	  
0.7	  
0.8	  
0.9	  
1	  
0	   0.2	   0.4	   0.6	   0.8	   1	  
Tr
ue
	  p
os
i*
ve
	  
False	  posi*ve	  
Network-­‐Based	   Neighborhood-­‐Based	  	  
Geographic	   Temporal	  
All	  
Figure 7: ROC curve for each feature set.
Table 8, RF provides the best performance (F1=0.83); we
also note that using SMOTE for RF, did not improve this
result. Figure 8 shows that our algorithm outperforms THH.
The performance of our features are also illustrated in Fig-
ure 7. The area under the curve (AUC) of applying all
features is 0.98 – a higher overall accuracy. The AUC for
network-based, neighborhood-based, geographic, and tem-
poral categories are 0.92, 0.91, 0.65, and 0.7 respectively.
This indicates the importance of network features for this
classification task.
5.2 Co-Offender Network Emerges Over Time
In this section, we present a more difficult experiment -
where the co-arrestee network is discovered over time (by
virtue of arrests). To simulate this phenomenon, we split
our data into two disjoint sets: the first set for learning
and identification, and the second one for measuring the
Table 8: K-fold cross validation.
Method Precision Recall F1
RF 0.89 0.78 0.83
RF w. SMOTE 0.86 0.78 0.82
NB 0.45 0.49 0.47
LR 0.68 0.49 0.57
DT 0.71 0.66 0.68
NN 0.64 0.57 0.6
SVM 0.73 0.2 0.31
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Figure 8: Performance comparison between THH and RF
in K-fold cross validation.
performance. We do monthly split and start from February
2013. To illustrate the difficulty of this test, we show the
number of nodes, edges, and violent individuals per month in
Figure 9. We note that in the early months, we are missing
much of the graphical data (over 40% of nodes and edges in
the first two months) - hence making many of our features
less effective. However, as the months progress, there are less
violent individuals to identify (due to the temporal nature of
the dataset) - hence amplifying the data imbalance as time
progresses.
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Figure 9: Number of nodes, edges, and violent individuals
over time. More training data, less offenders to identify.
In these experiments, we compared our approach using
random forests with the full feature set to THH and PVA.
We measure precision, recall, F1, number of true positives,
and number of false positives and display the results in Fig-
ures 10 and 11. In FRF (Filtered Random Forest) we fil-
ter the offenders who have not committed any crime in the
last 200 days. This simple heuristic increase the precision
drastically while preserving the recall. The main advantage
of our method, besides the high precision, is its ability to
significantly reduce the population of potentially violent of-
fenders when compared to PVA - which for each month had
between 1813 and 3571 false positives. Figure 11 compares
the number of true and false positives instances for all the
approaches for each month except PVA (PVA was omitted
due to readability because of the large amount of false posi-
tives). While the F1 measure for PVA is higher than that of
the others, the large number of false positives prevents the
law enforcement from using it effectively in practice. Fur-
thermore, as time progresses, PVA likely rises in recall due
to the drop in the number of violent criminals to predict.
6. RELATEDWORK
Though we believe that the prediction of violent offenders
using co-offender social networks is new, there has previously
been work on both co-offender networks in general as well
as crime forecasting. In this section, we briefly review some
of the relevant contributions in both of these areas.
There has been much previous work on co-offender net-
works. The earlier work that studied these special social
networks primarily came from the criminology literature.
For instance, [14] utilizes social network analysis techniques
to study several case studies where the social network of the
criminal organization was known. In [13], the authors study
the stability of these networks change over time. More re-
cently, graphical features derived from networks comprised
of both offenders and victims has been shown to be related
to the the probability of an individual becoming a victim
of a violent crime [17, 16]. Previous work has also looked
at the relationship between network structure and geogra-
phy [18] and has leveraged both network and geographic
features to predict criminal relationships [25] as well as in-
fluence gang members to dis-enroll [24]. There have also
been several software tools developed for conducting a wide-
range of analysis on co-offender networks including Crime-
Fighter [20], CrimeLink [22], and ORCA [19]. However, our
work departs from this is that we are looking to leverage
the network topology and other features to identify violent
offenders - which was not studied in any of the previous
work.
There has also been a large amount of work on crime fore-
casting (i.e. [7, 12]) though historically, this work has relied
on spatio-temporal modeling of criminal behavior [3, 21] or
was designed to identify suspects for specific crimes [26, 15].
None of this previous work was designed to identify future
violent offenders nor did it leverage social network structure.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we explored the problem of identifying re-
peat offenders who will commit violent crime. We showed
a strong relationship between network-based features and
whether a criminal will commit a violent offense providing
an unbiased F1 score of 0.83 in our cross-validation exper-
iment where we assumed that the underlying network was
known. When we moved to the case where the network
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Figure 10: Precision, recall, and F1 over time.
was discovered over time, our method significantly outper-
formed baseline approaches significantly increasing precision
and recall. We are currently discussing ways to operational-
ize this technology with the Chicago Police as well as design
strategies to best deploy police assets to areas with higher
concentrations of potentially violent offenders. We are also
working with the police to identify other sources of data to
build a more complete social network of the offenders.
Appendix
Shell Number. For a given graph, the k-core is the largest
subgraph where each node has at least degree k. The k-shell
is the set of nodes in core k but not in any higher core. A
node’s shell number is k value of the shell to which that node
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Figure 11: Number of true and false positive instances.
belongs. For a given node v and C ⊆ V, we define shellC(v)
as the shell number of node v on the subgraph consisting
of v and all nodes v′ where C ∩ Vv 6= ∅. We slightly abuse
notation and define shell∅(v) as the shell number of v on the
full network.
Propogation Process. For a given node v and the set of
activated nodes V ′, we define v’s active neighbors as follows:
actv(V
′) = {u|u ∈ N1v ∩ V ′}
We now define an activation function A that, given an initial
set of active nodes, returns a set of active nodes after one
time step.
Aκ(V
′) = V ′ ∪ {v ∈ V s.t. |actv(V ′)|≥ κ}
We also note that the activation function can be applied
iteratively, to model a diffusion process. Hence, we shall use
the following notation to signify multiple applications of A
(for natural numbers t > 1).
Atκ(V
′) =
{
Aκ(V
′) if t = 1
Aκ(A
t−1
κ (V
′)) otherwise
Clearly, when AtG,κ(V
′) = At−1G,κ(V
′) the process has con-
verged. Further, this always converges in no more than |V |
steps, since the process must activate at least one new node
in each step prior to converging. Based on this idea, we
define the function Γ which returns the set of all nodes acti-
vated upon the convergence of the activation function. We
define Γκ(V
′) = Aκ(V ′) where t is the least value such that
Atκ(V
′) = At−1κ (V
′).
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